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13 June 1957

Comments on DD/I Memo Concerning Responsibilities Related to Disarmaments dated 3 June 1957.

1. In order to make plans for [] role as related to disarmament, assumptions have to be made with respect to the type of "disarmament" agreements and degree of access in these agreements. For the purpose of this memo it is assumed that the basic principle of the agreement will be the assurance by each party that the other is not making preparations for attack. On this basis it is likely that inspection agreements will be made which permit:

a. Extensive aerial inspection.

b. US inspectors at a very limited number of transportation centers, strategic gateways, and airfields but little or no access to other military installations such as plants, test sites, and laboratories.

c. Far greater mobility of US personnel in the USSR than is now permitted.

d. Little or no access to information from the ministerial level other than is currently available.

[]

Almost all the information for [] would be of the bit-and-piece type requiring the handling of insurmountable quantities of raw data with little direct pertinence to the economic National Intelligence Objectives. It is not so much that the take would not include useful information but it is more a problem of identifying and separating such information from the vast quantities of trivia.

3. If [] is to prepare itself for processing and using these data for the stated objectives of supplementing the inspection processes and evaluating and supplementing its intelligence, []

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will have to formulate plans with respect to problems of training, organizing the information on hand in a useable form, storage of new information, processing equipment, and material handling methods. The training which would be required would be aimed at developing special skills [redacted]

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[redacted] The information on hand would have to be thoroughly reconsidered on a plant-by-plant basis so that the new material could be properly evaluated. While this would be worthwhile with respect to the military and strategic plants, the problem of identifying such installations from the vast amounts of data on hand as well as to-be-received would be extremely time consuming. A plant-by-plant analysis of the Soviet Union would be of little value from the over-all economic National Intelligence Objectives.

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4. It is desirable that the Agency realize the scope of the problems of handling, sorting, and evaluating the tremendous volume that could result from the inspection operation assumed above. It is further hoped that the Agency will have profited by the recent experiences of insufficient preparations concerning information processing equipment, and adequately trained personnel derived from operations such as [redacted]


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